Imagination as a starting point to support the postulates of practical reason in Kant

Abstract

The article is framed within the Kantian philosophy, and between the fields of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Our article argues that the transcendental imagination raised in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as the concepts of "original intuition" and "spontaneous representation" serve as a basis to support the postulates of practical reason exposed in the Critique of Practical Reason. It should be noted that the exposure that is sustained from the imagination, be it from the Critique of judgment, as well as from Anthropology in a pragmatic sense, increase in argumentation for the proposed hypothesis. Finally, it is not intended to demonstrate the reality of the postulates, because it is impossible and absurd, but only to expose its quid juris demonstration, that is, a transcendental demonstration of its necessity in accordance with speculative reason through a meaning that would be found under a transcendental significance.